The United States seized Li Ka-shing's Panama port operations through the courts, and there's far more behind this than just a business dispute.

On February 1, 2026, a ruling from Panama’s Supreme Court plunged Cheung Kong Group into crisis. The port enterprise, operating for 28 years, had its rights to operate two strategic ports confiscated on the grounds of “procedural lack of transparency and unconstitutionality.” Subsequently, the Danish shipping giant Maersk quickly took over. On the surface, this appears to be a judicial lawsuit or a sovereignty reclamation action, but a deeper analysis of the U.S. global military logistics layout reveals that this is actually a carefully orchestrated geopolitical strategy—using legal pretexts to systematically purge Chinese assets within its sphere of influence.

Maersk is not only a shipping magnate but also a reliable partner of the U.S. Department of Defense

Why was Maersk specifically chosen to take over these two ports? The answer uncovers the true logic behind the surface.

Maersk Line, Limited, the U.S. subsidiary of Maersk, is one of the highest-level maritime contractors for the U.S. Department of Defense. This is not ordinary commercial cooperation but a deep strategic binding. Maersk has long participated in the U.S. military’s VISA (Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement) and MSP (Maritime Security Program), meaning that at any moment, this fleet can be rapidly mobilized for military purposes.

From the Gulf War to the Iraq War, Maersk’s fleet has consistently handled large-scale logistics for the U.S. military. Now, with Panama’s two strategic ports “confiscated” and handed over to Maersk, the U.S. is executing a deeper strategic plan: shifting logistics hubs at both ends of the Panama Canal from a relatively neutral operator to a controllable scope under the Military Sealift Command (MSC).

This is not merely a “change of operator” but a redefinition of strategic control. In potential future Pacific conflicts, the U.S. military needs to ensure rapid, unobstructed passage through the Panama Canal. They cannot tolerate port cranes or data systems being controlled by a company perceived as “pro-China.” From a strategic security perspective, only fully controllable operators are acceptable.

Law as a tool for confiscation: the trap of “retroactive unconstitutionality”

The decision by Panama’s Supreme Court is shocking not only for its outcome but also for the precedent it sets.

The contract between Cheung Kong Group and the Panamanian government began in 1997 and was renewed in 2021, both times with lawful approval from Panama. But now, the court rules: “The procedures at that time were not sufficiently transparent, so the decision at that time is declared unconstitutional.” This breaks a fundamental legal principle—the stability of law and the prohibition of retroactive application.

This is called “retroactive unconstitutionality”: the court is not saying that the current operation is unconstitutional, but that a procedural decision made at some past point was unconstitutional, thus justifying the confiscation of assets that have been in operation for decades. It’s akin to a government suddenly annulling your birth certificate from decades ago—absurd, yet cloaked in legal justification.

For Chinese enterprises worldwide, this is an extremely dangerous signal. It means that no matter how legal and transparent your contracts are, if local political circumstances change and U.S. influence is strong enough, local courts can find “hindsight” reasons to declare your entire operation invalid from the outset. Even more frightening, since the asset is declared “unconstitutional,” you are almost impossible to obtain compensation—because legally, an invalid contract is considered never to have existed.

This is a “nuclear strike” against the global commercial contract system. The message is clear: the U.S. is redefining the standard of “legitimacy,” and this new standard is “aligned with U.S. strategic interests.” Any business activity that does not meet this standard—regardless of how long it has operated or how much money has been invested—can be confiscated overnight.

What does Li Ka-shing’s departure signify?

The symbolic significance of Cheung Kong Group’s ordeal lies in the fact that Li Ka-shing has never been seen as an “anti-American” entrepreneur. On the contrary, CK Group’s business style has always been regarded as relatively open and pro-Western. Its investments in Panama ports, including an $1.8 billion equipment upgrade, portrayed a responsible, long-term committed operator image.

But all of this did not protect CK Group’s assets. This indicates that the U.S. “clean-up” of Chinese assets has become less about gentleness or selectivity. If even Li Ka-shing, perceived as a “moderate,” cannot safeguard his port operations, it signals that U.S. geopolitical adjustments have entered a new phase: shifting from control to monopoly; from allowing Chinese presence to demanding Chinese withdrawal.

This sounds a final warning. In the past, Chinese companies believed they could secure local support through business ties, technological investments, and long-term commitments. But reality proves that in the face of absolute security concerns, these efforts are naive. The U.S. is willing to sacrifice its allied reputation (such as Panama’s commercial credibility) to remove China’s “strategic nails.”

How should China adjust its strategy after confiscation?

In the long run, the profound implication of Li Ka-shing’s case is that China must rethink its strategic layout in Latin America. Relying on a single port is fragile, especially when ownership can be arbitrarily changed under the guise of legality.

China needs to accelerate the “New Land-Sea Corridor” strategy, which is not just about diversifying transportation routes but also breaking U.S. strategic monopoly. Specifically, developing projects like the Quingkai Port in Peru and the transoceanic railway to establish an independent logistics loop that does not depend on the Panama Canal or U.S. influence.

Simultaneously, China’s investment strategy in Latin America should shift from “point breakthroughs” to “systematic defense.” It’s not enough to rely on the success of a single port or project; a multi-point, mutually supporting strategic network must be built. This involves strengthening political engagement with multiple Latin American countries, improving foresight into local political changes, and designing contracts that better protect Chinese investors’ long-term interests.

The old rules are dead; camp logic has taken over

The Panama Canal’s waters still flow, but the rules governing this domain have changed. Cheung Kong’s exit is not just a business event but marks the end of an era—the decline of globalization and free trade-based business logic in Latin America.

From now on, U.S. expropriation of Chinese assets in Latin America will be overt, no longer needing any commercial pretext. Panama thought it had reclaimed sovereignty, but in reality, it merely took its keys from a “diligent tenant” Li Ka-shing and handed them over kneeling to the true power—“the armed bully.” What appears as judicial action is, in fact, naked power redistribution. Chinese enterprises worldwide must recognize this reality: in the vortex of geopolitics, law is often just a servant of power.