#DAO治理 Aave's recent controversy is quite interesting. $140 million in annual revenue indeed demonstrates the protocol's ability to generate value, but the issue isn't how much revenue there is, rather whether the DAO voting mechanism truly represents the interests of the holders.

My observation is: Stani buying $15 million worth of AAVE and not participating in voting is a key detail, indicating he's trying to avoid direct conflicts of interest. But from a follow-the-leader perspective, what really matters is—**whether the interest alignment mechanism between Labs and the DAO can be implemented**.

If the alignment mechanism is just a verbal promise and subsequent voting remains chaotic, then the voting power of AAVE holders is still diluted. At this point, projects like follow-the-leader should be cautious, as governance chaos often signals execution risks.

Conversely, if they can truly strengthen mechanisms to align the interests of large holders and small investors, AAVE's long-term stability will be stronger. Now, we need to see how the next few voting rounds perform—this is the real test of sincerity.