A decline of 500 million over half a year, but Fumei struggles to sustain the growth myth of Juzhi Biotech.

Ask AI · How Will the Trust Crisis in Reconstituted Collagen Affect Juzo Biotech’s Future Strategy?

Author | Guo Jianan

The boots have finally dropped.

“2025 operating revenue was 5.519 billion yuan, down 0.4% year over year, and attributable net profit was 1.915 billion yuan, down 7.1% year over year.” Recently, Juzo Biotech’s 2025 annual report caused the industry to reevaluate this “No. 1 stock in restructured collagen.”

Since going public in 2022, this is the first time Juzo Biotech has experienced declines in both revenue and net profit. Especially compared to 2024’s revenue growth of 57.2% and profit growth of 42.4%, this sharp decline also caused Juzo Biotech—once the leader in efficacy skincare, driven by its flagship product “Kefuimei”—to slam the brakes.

This is closely related to last year’s 618 promotion period, when Dr. Dazui’s claims about “Kefuimei” ingredients being overpriced were exposed.

The controversy erupted at the end of May and fermented on a large scale throughout June. Although Juzo Biotech, Dr. Dazui, and later Huaxi Biotech each maintained their own positions, it still caused a severe trust crisis among consumers and channels, directly impacting Juzo Biotech’s growth in the second half of the year. It’s important to note that in the first half of 2025, Juzo still maintained a total revenue of 3.112 billion yuan and a net profit of 1.182 billion yuan, with year-over-year growth rates of 22.5% and 20.6%, respectively.

In the beauty industry, where “the brand’s second half should outperform the first,” Juzo Biotech did not see a sales recovery in Q3 and Q4. Especially for the core brand Kefuimei, which accounts for over 80% of revenue, sales in the second half were only 1.93 billion yuan—down more than 540 million yuan compared to the same period last year—highlighting the profound impact of the negative incident.

“Dr. Dazui’s firing was just the trigger. The deeper reason is that competition in the skincare track has intensified, the livestream e-commerce dividend has faded, and there is a trust crisis regarding ingredients on the brand side,” Gao Han, a senior beauty industry practitioner, told Du Jiao.

Despite attempts by Juzo Biotech to regain channel profits through deepening offline channels, boosting brand self-broadcasting, and pursuing multiple strategies such as entering hair care and cleansing segments, launching new brands, and boldly promoting “medical device” category aesthetic products to expand into the third-class medical device market, these efforts are either uncertain or unsuccessful at this stage.

“The key issue remains the ingredient problem. Juzo Biotech started with the concept of restructured collagen, but the trend of ingredients in the beauty industry has become too fast. The era of restructured collagen racing ahead has ended.” Gao Han stated.

As late as the end of last year, many posts on Xiaohongshu (Little Red Book) questioning the efficacy of Kefuimei collagen sticks still discussed “restructured collagen applied topically cannot penetrate the skin” and “it’s a scam tax,” indicating the lingering aftershock of the Dr. Dazui incident.

At the end of May last year, beauty influencer “Dr. Dazui” publicly questioned that Kefuimei’s star product “collagen stick” contained far less restructured collagen than labeled, suspected of ingredient fraud. As this accusation spread on social media, Huaxi Biotech, a leader in hyaluronic acid, also entered the fray, sparking a debate over the two major ingredients—“restructured collagen” and “hyaluronic acid.”

This controversy ultimately concluded with a vague statement that “testing standards differ,” but it caused widespread distrust among consumers toward “restructured collagen,” the core ingredient. “Many users used to be willing to pay a premium for Kefuimei’s second-generation collagen sticks, mainly because they valued the brand’s ‘medical device’ license and the technological barriers built around the core ingredient. The ambiguous responses from Juzo Biotech during the incident shook some of these cautious consumers,” said Gao Han.

“Rather than spending hundreds of yuan on skincare products that may or may not work, it’s better to spend around two thousand yuan to get injections of Weini Beauty, where the effect on eye wrinkles is much clearer.” Ali, a consumer from Xiamen, told Du Jiao.

Just as many aesthetic medicine projects replaced ultra-high-end brands before, the significantly discounted restructured collagen injection products are also diverting the core audience that recognizes this ingredient. Last year, Weini Beauty, a brand under Jinqiao Biotech focused on tightening and anti-aging injections, saw its price drop from 6,800 yuan via official channels to 1,300–1,500 yuan due to impact from the Yanqianzhen category and platform subsidies. This led many female consumers to switch to “injection methods” from a vertical perspective.

“Although the overlap between aesthetic injection users and efficacy skincare users isn’t very high, Weini Beauty’s price cuts have essentially scrambled the entire restructured collagen market’s price hierarchy. If high-end injectables are now so cheap, how much value does Kefuimei—claimed as ‘efficacy skincare’—still have? Can a collagen stick costing a few hundred yuan compete with aesthetic injections? Once such doubts arise, Kefuimei’s repurchase rate will also decline,” Gao Han explained.

Meanwhile, Kefuimei faces a serious internal crisis. Du Jiao observed that the “Collagen Stick 2.0,” launched last year, did not replicate the success of 1.0—in fact, it received numerous negative reviews. Currently, searching for Kefuimei Collagen Stick 2.0 on Xiaohongshu reveals frequent complaints such as “texture too sticky,” “poor quality control,” and “allergic reactions.”

“I used Collagen Stick 1.0 for a long time, stockpiling it. After trying 2.0, I immediately developed allergies. The glycerin in 2.0 is just too unfriendly to me,” said Ricky, a long-time user. After experiencing the issues, she quickly switched back to 1.0, but now the original version is increasingly hard to find: “I used to buy it from offline channels like Xianyu, Dewu, and Watsons, but now the official production has stopped, and it’s getting harder to buy. I’ve stopped using it.”

Beyond the brand crisis and product quality issues, Juzo Biotech is also facing drastic adjustments in channel strategies. Over the past two years, it has heavily relied on top-tier livestream hosts, especially Li Jiaqi’s live room, which was a key driver behind the explosive growth of Kefuimei’s collagen sticks.

However, in 2025, Juzo Biotech proactively shifted away from “head celebrity reliance.” To control discount levels and improve brand profitability, it drastically reduced collaborations with agencies in Q4 last year and focused on self-broadcasting. For example, in October last year, according to data from Chan Mom, its influencer collaborations were cut in half.

Meanwhile, during last year’s 618 and Double 11 shopping festivals, Kefuimei tightened its promotional strategies in many top livestream rooms. Many consumers reported, “With the same 120 sticks and unit price, the sales during Li Jiaqi’s 2025 618 and Double 11 were much more expensive than in 2024 Double 11—rising to six or seven hundred yuan.” This also caused the promotional efforts to falter. According to a report from China Merchants Securities International, Kefuimei’s GMV during last year’s Double 11 declined by about 30% year-over-year.

Clearly, building a self-broadcasting channel is not an overnight task. Its growth rate and conversion efficiency cannot, in the short term, compensate for the huge gap left by the absence of agency-driven sales.

Adding external competitors’ encroachment, last year, Jinqiao Biotech, which also focuses on restructured collagen and has heavily entered functional skincare with brands like Zhenyuan and ProtYouth®, was also eating into Kefuimei’s turf. Major brands like L’Oréal, Estée Lauder, and Huaxi Biotech increased their investments in restructured collagen skincare, further fragmenting the market. Many new products are priced significantly lower—one example is “Tongping,” a restructured collagen product that gained popularity in Li Jiaqi’s livestream during last year’s 618, produced via ODM by Jinqiao Biotech.

Under internal and external pressures, Juzo Biotech, heavily dependent on Kefuimei as its flagship product, has not reversed its decline but has instead paused its progress.

In response to the decline of its core brand Kefuimei, Juzo Biotech explicitly stated in its 2025 annual report that its goal for 2026 is to “return to growth.” During the earnings call, it further emphasized the “dual-beauty strategy”—coordinated development of skincare and aesthetic medicine.

Clearly, the restructured type I natural sequence collagen facial injection product and the restructured collagen and sodium hyaluronate composite solution implant, approved by the National Medical Products Administration in October last year and January this year respectively, are expected to be key to its expansion into aesthetic medicine and growth. Juzo Biotech places high hopes on revenue from the three categories of medical devices (“medical device category”).

Previously, Juzo Biotech’s revenue was nearly 80% from functional skincare, but the higher-margin medical dressings and aesthetic injectables accounted for a smaller share. The two injectable products, used for facial dermal filling and improving facial smoothness, were approved and launched sequentially after receiving approval from the National Medical Products Administration. This marks that Juzo Biotech has officially obtained an “entry ticket” into the aesthetic medicine field.

But this also means it will directly compete with Jinqiao Biotech, which holds similar licenses and has a deep market foundation. The two will intrude into each other’s territory and fiercely compete for market share in both B-end and C-end restructured collagen markets.

The B-end aesthetic medicine injection market is a tough nut, requiring new team organization and channel development. Previously, Juzo Biotech’s upstream accumulation was mainly through hospital dressing channels, which follow different sales logic from aesthetic medicine injectables. Juzo needs to build a professional operations team, coordinate with aesthetic medicine clinics’ sales teams, and establish doctor education teams to ensure safety and proper usage—these demands place high requirements on the brand’s service system and team capabilities.

Meanwhile, at this entry point, the aesthetic medicine injection market is highly competitive, with many players initiating price wars. According to Jinqiao Biotech’s 2025 performance forecast, while revenue increased by 10.57%, attributable net profit fell by 11.08%, indicating that increased marketing expenses and R&D investments to promote new raw materials and ensure technical capacity have squeezed profits. Additionally, last year’s frequent price cuts of Weini Beauty’s core raw material in offline channels significantly impacted Jinqiao’s profit margins.

As a “first mover,” Jinqiao Biotech still faces profit declines. It’s foreseeable that for “latecomer” Juzo Biotech to gain market share, it will need to invest even more heavily in promotion, which will also greatly impact its profit margins. Whether it’s quickly establishing a channel network comparable to Jinqiao’s or building influence for its own injectables, both require substantial costs.

In its financial report, Juzo Biotech’s other key growth strategy is “deeply cultivating brand self-operations and establishing dual online and offline sales channels,” with offline stores as a focus for incremental growth, aiming for “around 50 stores by 2026.” But based on its current offline revenue and overall income, this path remains long and challenging.

In 2025, Juzo Biotech launched large-scale offline brand stores. By the end of last year, it covered key commercial districts in cities like Xi’an, Chengdu, Chongqing, and Hangzhou, with a total of 32 stores. However, the offline direct sales revenue in 2025 was only 225 million yuan, just 4.1% of total revenue, with an average store revenue of about 7 million yuan annually.

Kefuimei Hangzhou Xiaoshan Wansianghui Store

For core commercial districts, building offline channels involves high rent, labor, and management costs, with long payback periods. Today, Juzo Biotech’s revenue—whether profit margins or growth prospects—remains uncertain. More than earning profits and driving performance, it seems more like a “brand-building” project.

As for Juzo Biotech’s third core strategy—“building the ability to create reproducible blockbuster products” in efficacy skincare—this is even more difficult in today’s fiercely competitive online environment.

“In fact, whether it’s Hanshu, Juzo Biotech, or Huaxi Biotech, it’s very difficult for big players to develop new blockbuster products in the past two years. On one hand, online traffic costs have surged, and the best period for growth has passed. Second, competition in domestic beauty sub-segments is fierce, with overseas brands joining price wars and emerging domestic brands rising—everyone is fighting for market share of new top-tier products. Especially since the flagship products of these top brands already cover the mass skincare market, new categories or high-end products may also cause consumer-brand recognition conflicts. So many new products from large groups face difficulties in breaking through,” Gao Han explained.

It’s clear that whether in aesthetic medicine or efficacy skincare, Juzo Biotech faces significant challenges. Both offensively and defensively, it must bear higher costs.

Of course, Juzo Biotech’s core remains stable. Kefuimei, despite slowing growth, still holds market mindshare. Its gross margin remains above 80%, and with ample cash reserves, it has enough room for trial and error. Relying on existing users, Juzo is unlikely to experience a sharp decline in the short term. But the road ahead is fraught with difficulties.

The biggest issue is the cooling of the “restructured collagen” concept. Unlike the rapid surge of the past two years, the restructured collagen market has entered a period of calm. The influx of competitors, Jinqiao Biotech’s direct confrontations, and the shouting matches with Huaxi Biotech have all impacted the industry’s excess profits. And on the consumer side, changing trends can be sudden and unpredictable.

“In anti-aging, PDRN (polydeoxyribonucleotide) is expected to have a new breakout this year, and many efficacy skincare brands are emphasizing this new ingredient. In injections, exosomes are also very hot. Of course, after the 315 event this year, a new concept trend may emerge. Just like hyaluronic acid before, then restructured collagen later—skincare always needs new concepts,” said ingredient blogger Song Song.

It’s obvious that Juzo Biotech has already passed the “ingredient dividend” honeymoon period. Whether it can make further breakthroughs in R&D and channel management will likely determine its next phase.