15 years after the Fukushima nuclear accident, Japan's nuclear regulatory system remains full of loopholes

【Global Times Special Correspondent in Japan Shao Nan, Lin Xueyuan, and Global Times Reporter Ding Yazhi】Editor’s note: March 11 marks the 15th anniversary of Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster. Earlier this month, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting, China’s Permanent Representative to the IAEA, Ambassador Li Song, pointed out that while the Fukushima nuclear accident appears to be a natural disaster, it was actually caused by human error, exposing serious flaws in Japan’s nuclear safety regulation system. Most measures Japan took after the accident are merely stopgap solutions with limited effectiveness; cases of dishonesty, deception, and radioactive leaks by nuclear power companies like TEPCO continue to emerge. Over the past 15 years, the Japanese government has clearly failed to conduct a thorough reflection on the Fukushima disaster. With insufficient accountability for the accident and numerous loopholes in nuclear safety oversight, Japan is eager to restart nuclear power applications and even frequently tests the limits of nuclear military capabilities, blurring the boundaries between civilian nuclear power and potential military nuclear capabilities. This dangerous trend warrants vigilance from regional countries and the international community.

Continuous Safety Incidents and Violations

On January 21 this year, TEPCO restarted Unit 6 at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant in Niigata Prefecture. Kashiwazaki-Kariwa is Japan’s largest nuclear power plant and has been shut down since the 2011 Fukushima disaster. In fact, this restart was a delayed result—during the testing phase, TEPCO discovered at least 88 errors related to control rod functions used to regulate reactor output. After an emergency review and restart, alarms suddenly sounded within a day, causing the unit to shut down again, and it was not restarted until February 9.

This series of setbacks in the restart process has sparked strong opposition and deep concern among local residents, who held multiple protests outside TEPCO headquarters. One protester said, “I oppose the restart of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa. TEPCO still has many cover-ups, concealments, and deceptions… We will never give up our opposition to restarting.”

According to investigations, from 1977 to 2007, TEPCO conducted 199 regular inspections of 13 of its nuclear reactors, during which it tampered with data, concealed safety hazards, and covered up accidents. The criticality accident at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 in 1978 was kept secret by TEPCO until 2007. In 2000, internal whistleblowers revealed that TEPCO had concealed cracks in reactor pipes for up to eight years. After the 2011 nuclear accident, TEPCO knew the core had melted but deliberately used the term “core damage” to cover it up. The company also claimed for a long time that no new contaminated water had been discharged into the ocean, only admitting to the truth under public pressure in 2013.

In recent years, TEPCO’s risk concealment and management chaos have persisted. In 2021, a leak occurred at a Fukushima nuclear wastewater storage tank, which was only acknowledged after media exposure. In February 2024, a leak of 5.5 tons of contaminated water at Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant was downplayed by TEPCO, claiming it had “no impact outside the plant.” Last November, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa was found to have multiple management flaws, including staff copying and retaining nuclear-related confidential documents, misdelivering nuclear safety secrets to contractors, and bringing tools into the plant without proper procedures. Yet, these issues did not prevent the plant from passing restart inspections.

Industry experts in Japan point out that such incidents indicate ongoing challenges in nuclear safety management. More worryingly, these problems are often only uncovered through internal whistleblowing or after investigations, further questioning Japan’s nuclear safety regulatory system.

Regulatory Bodies and the “Nuclear Village”

Military expert Zhang Junsha told Global Times that after Fukushima, Japan established the independent Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and adopted new nuclear safety standards, but these measures have had limited practical effect, and Japan’s nuclear safety oversight still has many loopholes.

First, the independence of the regulatory agency is severely lacking, with close ties to government interests. As early as the early 2000s, when TEPCO was exposed for fraud, Japanese media and academia often used the term “nuclear village” to describe the network of interests surrounding the nuclear industry, which includes government departments, electric power companies, nuclear equipment firms, research institutions, and politicians. They form a vested interest web through mechanisms like revolving doors, academic dependence, and political donations, leading to weakened safety standards, regulatory failures, and declining public trust. Although the NRA was ostensibly created to address the “nuclear village” problem—tasked with safety reviews and emergency response—it is actually under the Ministry of the Environment, making true independence impossible. Its inspections and conclusions are often influenced by government interference, undermining its authority and impartiality. The first chairman, Tanaka Toshio, previously served as deputy director-general of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, and many staff members come from the nuclear safety administrative system. This has raised concerns about the close relationship between nuclear regulators and the industry.

Second, the agency lacks initiative and enforces regulations poorly. Zhang Junsha explained that the NRA does not have a robust on-site inspection mechanism and mainly relies on self-reporting by nuclear operators. Since companies like TEPCO have long lacked integrity and often try to downplay or minimize safety issues, relying solely on self-inspections cannot ensure safety oversight.

Third, the new nuclear safety standards are outdated compared to international standards. After Fukushima, Japan in 2013 adopted new standards, claiming they were “the strictest in the world.” However, Zhang Junsha pointed out that Japan’s current standards lag behind international best practices, with some reactors’ design standards not keeping pace with the latest safety requirements, especially in key areas like containment shell temperature and seismic resistance, which do not fully meet IAEA standards.

“Return to Nuclear Power Not Just for Energy Security, But Also Military Intentions”

The environmental organization FoE Japan released a report titled “The Current State of Fukushima and the Future of Energy,” stating that after Fukushima, Japan temporarily shut down all 54 reactors. As of February this year, 15 of Japan’s 33 operational reactors have been restarted. Meanwhile, Japan is pushing for more reactor reviews and restarts, with the nuclear business of heavy industry companies growing.

According to a March 11 report by Jiji Press, after Fukushima, the then Democratic Party government announced it would “devote all policy resources” to achieve “zero nuclear power” by the 2030s. However, after the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito regained power at the end of 2012, policies shifted toward restarting reactors. Since last year, the Japanese government has actively promoted policies to “maximize” nuclear power use.

Japanese media attribute the government’s push for “returning to nuclear power” to energy security concerns. Japan has long depended on imports of natural gas and oil, and recent conflicts involving Russia-Ukraine and Middle Eastern instability have caused energy market volatility, accelerating reactor reviews and restarts. Currently, renewable energy growth remains sluggish—solar farms cause environmental damage, offshore wind projects have stalled after Mitsubishi’s withdrawal, and the government has had to re-tender.

Japan also seeks to promote nuclear fuel recycling and reprocessing under the pretext of “reusing spent fuel.” Since 1999, Japan has stored large amounts of spent fuel, awaiting the operation of reprocessing plants in Rokkasho Village, Aomori Prefecture, and MOX fuel fabrication facilities. Japan also exports spent fuel to France and other countries for reprocessing to obtain separated plutonium. While technically feasible, these facilities face resistance. For example, the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, started in 1993 with an original completion date of 1997, has been delayed multiple times due to cost overruns and safety standards. After passing safety reviews in 2020, it faced strong opposition and is now expected to begin operation in fiscal year 2026.

FoE Japan issued a statement on March 5, marking the 15th anniversary of Fukushima, raising several serious issues: first, 15 years on, TEPCO’s management responsibilities remain unaddressed, yet Unit 6 at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa has been restarted; second, the Rokkasho reprocessing plant has been delayed 27 times, and the issues of spent fuel management and final disposal remain unresolved; third, Fukushima accident cleanup costs are estimated at 23.5 trillion yen (about 102 billion yuan), but do not include some radioactive waste disposal costs; fourth, the government has shifted the burden of nuclear maintenance and new construction onto the public through financing and guarantees. The statement also criticized the suppression of public debate on nuclear contaminated water discharge and reuse of contaminated soil, labeling critics as “creating negative public opinion,” thus restricting discussion.

Japan’s nuclear expert, former associate professor Hiroaki Koide of Kyoto University’s Reactor Research Institute, pointed out in an interview that Japan’s long-standing “nuclear fuel cycle” policy is not only about energy security but also about maintaining nuclear development capabilities. Reprocessing and fast breeder reactor systems enable Japan to continuously obtain plutonium, which has sensitive military attributes. Currently, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government signals dangerous intentions in nuclear policy, openly hinting at possibly breaking the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” confirming Koide’s analysis and exposing long-standing Japanese right-wing ambitions for nuclear weapons.

Japan’s Government Intentionally Downplays “Nuclear Risk Memory”

On January 8, this year, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and the China Nuclear Strategy Planning Institute jointly released a report titled “Japan’s Right-Wing Nuclear Ambitions: A Serious Threat to World Peace” (hereafter “the report”). The report states that Japan currently possesses the technical and economic capacity to achieve nuclear armament in a short time. Many international nuclear experts regard Japan as a “potential nuclear-armed state.”

The report highlights Japan’s nuclear capabilities across multiple dimensions. On one hand, Japan’s nuclear industry is strong enough to produce weapons-grade plutonium using existing technology and facilities. Japan is the only non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT that has mastered reprocessing technology, can extract weapons-grade plutonium, and has operational reprocessing facilities. On the other hand, Japan may have secretly produced weapons-grade plutonium, with high international suspicion. Japan’s stockpile of separated plutonium far exceeds its civilian nuclear needs, with a total of 44.4 tons as of the end of 2024, far beyond what is required for peaceful purposes. This long-term imbalance raises concerns about proliferation.

Fifteen years after Fukushima, the Japanese government has clearly not conducted a thorough reflection. Zhang Junsha said, “Currently, some segments of Japanese society are experiencing a fading of nuclear risk awareness, which is closely related to the government’s deliberate guidance: first, long-term concealment of nuclear risks has deprived the public of accurate knowledge; second, downplaying the impact of nuclear accidents and propagating false narratives that accidents are ‘under control’; third, pushing for the discharge of contaminated water into the ocean to eliminate visible nuclear pollution traces; fourth, promoting nuclear energy’s role in energy security and low-carbon development to reduce public vigilance against nuclear risks.”

The Japanese government’s insufficient accountability for the accident, numerous regulatory loopholes, and its eagerness to restart nuclear power and even explore nuclear military capabilities are fundamentally inconsistent with Japan’s identity as a defeated nation and its postwar peace constitution, “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” and “Exclusive Defense” policy. Zhang Junsha emphasized, “Such ambitions reflect a lack of deep reflection on the reasons behind the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and ignore that the root cause of nuclear attacks was Japan’s militaristic aggression. If Japan relaxes restrictions and truly develops nuclear military capabilities, it would mean a revival of militarism and could lead Japan to pursue external aggression again. This would be a disaster for the Asia-Pacific region and should be closely watched by all Asian countries and peoples.”