Walrus Sites is hyped up as a miracle, claiming that once data is stored there, it can never be changed, making it inherently censorship-resistant. Sounds great, but there's a practical issue that's been overlooked — web pages need to be updated.

So, how do you implement updates? You must introduce a dynamic intermediary layer, usually a SuiNS domain or an Object ID on the chain. This acts as a pointer, responsible for directing to the latest HTML Blob. It still sounds decentralized, right?

Here's the problem. The truly vulnerable part isn't the underlying storage but the "pointer" itself. Suppose a hacker compromises your Sui wallet or injects malicious logic into the domain resolver. They don't need to modify the data already written on Walrus. They can't, nor do they want to. All they need is a simple operation: point the pointer to another Blob ID containing a phishing webpage. When users open the domain, they see the familiar interface, but behind the scenes, it has been replaced.

Even more frightening is that this kind of attack is more covert than traditional server breaches. Because users subconsciously believe "decentralized storage = security," they lower their guard. The immutability of Walrus itself becomes a psychological trap.

Therefore, my clear recommendation is: the permission to update the pointer must be managed by a multi-signature wallet. Any changes should be time-locked, giving the community enough time to audit code modifications. Without this governance framework, your "decentralized front end" is essentially just shifting the single point of failure from the cloud provider's backend to the developer's private keys. The risk isn't eliminated; it's just moved elsewhere.